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ARTICLE
ON THE CENTRALITY OF
INFORMATION LAW: A RATIONAL
CHOICE DISCUSSION OF
INFORMATION LAW
AND TRANSPARENCY
by

PROFESSOR WILLIAM MOCKt

For the civil authority being more visible, and standing in the clearer
light of natural reason, cannot choose but draw to it in all times a very
considerable part of the people ....
-Thomas

I.

Hobbes, Leviathan

INTRODUCTION

The existence of a Computer and Information Law Journal presupposes the existence of information law. Information law, in turn, rests
upon two premises. The first of these premises is that information is a
legally cognizable concept - that it can be framed in legal terms and has
legal significance. The second is that there exists a rationale for government regulation and provision of information, either explicitly (through
legislation) or implicitly (through adjudication). This Article addresses
those two premises in the context of official transparency, which is,
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roughly speaking, a term referring to governmental openness and provision of information on government operations to the general public. In so
doing, it explores the significance of transparency and information law to
ordered society, broadly outlining why information law and, in particular, transparency are so worthy of serious scholarly consideration, both
within this Journal and elsewhere.
This Article begins by looking at the nature of information. In doing
so, it reviews the literature available from the developed field of information theory, as well as from the somewhat younger field of information
law. This review produces a reasonable working definition of "information" in a legal context. This is followed by a similar review of transparency, drawn from a wide assortment of scholarly disciplines.
Next, this Article applies rational choice approaches to the issue of
government regulation of information. Rational choice theory, drawn
from the fields of economics and political economics, supposes that people
act rationally in their best personal and strategic interests.1 Given the
breadth of this subject, however, this Article focuses on one area of government regulation - that of requirements on governments to provide
information to the public. Market failures related to inherent qualities
of the marketplace for information provide a strong rationale for a policy
of high official transparency. In addition, transparency is a vital response to certain problems of the political economy of government functioning. The centrality of transparency and information law to broad
democratic participation in the ordering of public life flows naturally
from these observations.
It is also important to note what this Article does not attempt to do.
In focusing on the development of standards of official transparency as
governmental regulation, it does not address rationales for governments
to regulate information provision, content, or flow with respect to nongovernmental sources. This is not because such issues are unimportant,
but because this Article's purpose is to demonstrate the importance of
developing official standards and policies for information disclosure regarding governmental operations. Nor does it establish a complete argument on all the social, economic, and political values inherent in
governmental regulation of information - such an effort must await a
much longer and comprehensively interdisciplinary work on this subject.
1. "I mean by 'rational choice theory' the . . . claim that, regardless of what sort of
ends people pursue, they do so through strategic, instrumentally rational behavior." JAMES
W. FRIEDMAN, GAME THEORY WITH APPLICATIONS To ECONOMICS 2 (1986); see also KENNETH
J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDMwiDuAL VALUES (1963). But see Steven Shulman, What's
so Rational about Rational Expectations? Hyperrationalityand the Logical Limits to Neo-

classicism, 20 J. POST

KEYNESIAN ECON.

135 (1997). "Rational expectations is an example of

'hyperrationality,' a term Jon Ester has coined to describe an 'irrational belief in the omnipotence of reason.'" Id. at 29 (citation omitted).
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In short, this Article is about rationales for and the centrality of information law with respect to government operations and it seeks no more
than to stake a claim for the fuller study of transparency and information law.
Despite what this Article will argue is a fundamental role for transparency, and hence for information law, in governance of a healthy body
politic, there has been very little written about transparency in legal
scholarship in the United States. In the course of writing this and related scholarship, the author and his researchers have uncovered only a
few dozen works in English over the past twenty years that deal with
transparency in more than a cursory fashion. The large majority of those
works have been produced by international organizations 2 or have been
books 3 or conference proceedings, 4 often published outside the United
5
States. Others deal with very narrow aspects of transparency and law.
On the premise that United States law review articles provide a rough
measure of the level of contemporary scholarship on a subject, it is worth
noting that the author has identified only a small handful of law review
articles dealing seriously with any aspect of transparency. 6 There has
2.

See, e.g., ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, GOVERNANCE AND REGULATORY REGIMES FOR

FINAL REPORT (1998) [hereinafter ASIAN
DEVELOPMENT BANK, 19981; Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD): Transparency for Positive Adjustment: Identifying and Evaluating Government
Adjustment (1983) [hereinafter OECD Paper 1983]; IBRAHIM F.I. SHIHATA, COMPLEMENPRIVATE SECTOR INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT:

TARY REFORM: ESSAYS ON LEGAL, JUDICIAL, AND OTHER INSTITUTIONAL REFORMS SUPPORTED

BY THE WORLD BANK (1997).
3. See, e.g., ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY:
COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS (1995); CATHERINE CLARK
CROSS ET AL.,

COMING CLEAN:

CREATING TRANSPARENCY IN DEVELOPMENT FUNDING IN

SOUTH AFRICA (Indicator Press 1995); PATRICK PILLAI, ET AL., MANAGING TRUST: TRANSPARENCY, ACCOUNTABILITY & ETHICS IN MALAYSIA (ISIS/Goethe Institut Kuala Lumpur,

1995).
4. See, e.g., ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, GOVERNANCE: PROMOTING SOUND DEVELOPMENT SEMINAR MANAGEMENT (1997) [hereinafter ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, 1997];
MICHAEL M. HART & DEBRA P. STEGER, DUE PROCESS AND TRANSPARENCY IN INTERNATIONAL

TRADE (1992).
5. See, e.g., Gary Banks, Vested Interests, Domestic Transparency and International
Trade Policy, INTERECONOMICS, 133 (May/June 1984); CRoss; supra note 3; BATES GILL, &
J.N. MAK, REPORT ON ARMS, TRANSPARENCY, AND SECURITY IN SOUTH-EAST ASIA (SIPRI RES.
REP. No. 13 (1997); BATES GILL, ET AL., REPORT ON ARMS ACQUISITIONS: DEVELOPING TRANS.
PARENCY (Malaysian Institute of Maritime Affairs) (1995).
6. See, e.g., E. J. Mestmacker, NaturalGas in the EuropeanInternal Market: A Comparative Analysis of Common Carriageand Price Transparency, 11 MICH. J. INT'L. L. 691
(1990); Asif Qureshi, The New GATT Trade Policy Review Mechanism: An Exercise in
Transparency or Enforcement, J. WORLD TRADE 147 (1990); Mark J. Spaulding, Transparency of EnvironmentalRegulation and Public Participationin the Resolution of International EnvironmentalDisputes, 35 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1127 (1995); F. Upham, The Legal
Framework of Japan'sDeclining IndustriesPolicy: The Problem of Transparencyin Administrative Processes, 27 HARV. INT'L. L. .J. 425 (1986). There are quite a number of other
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been an extensive non-law literature dealing with information and
transparency, 7 but legal scholarship appears to have lagged. A purpose
of this Article is begin to rectify that oversight.
II.

WHAT IS INFORMATION?

"Information," even to information theorists, is a problematic term.
The word as used in normal English parlance is hardly precise. 8 Within
the scholarly information theory literature, there appear to be two or
three major approaches to the meaning of "information."
One major approach traces to Kenneth Arrow, the 1972 Nobel Laureate in Economics, who wrote that "[tihe meaning of information is precisely a reduction in uncertainty."9 This approach looks at information
as something - anything - that alters the awareness of the recipient and
makes that recipient perceive the world as a different place than it was
before. What is clear from Arrow's remark, even at first reading, is that
there must be some interaction between the potential information and a
recipient in order for the potential to become actual information. There
must be some party whose uncertainty is reduced.
An interesting question is whether something that increases the recipient's uncertainty constitutes information. Consider an example to
clarify this problem. Reports of Galileo's observations of four moons circling the planet Jupiter would, for many devout Catholics of his day,
have introduced doubt into their worlds - doubt about the certainty of
articles mentioning transparency in passing, usually treating the term as a familiar quantity needing no further explication. The author gives his apologies to any authors of overlooked works, and would appreciate hearing of such works in furtherance of his ongoing
research.
7. E.g., VINCENT MOSCO & JANET WASKO, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INFORMATION

(1988); Louis PHLIPS, THE ECONOMICS OF IMPERFECT INFORMATION (1988), George J. Stigler,
The Economics of Information, 69 J. OF POL. ECON. 213 (1961). A review of the works cited
in footnotes throughout this Article will reveal a wide range of such literature from such
fields as information theory, game theory, political economy, and development theory.
8. See generally DAN SCHILLER, HOW TO THINK ABouT INFORMATION 27-28 (cited in
Vincent Mosco & Janet Wasko, The Political Economy of Information, eds. 1988). Schiller
notes its use by Chaucer in the Tale of Melibius (second to last I of the work) in the sense of
"guidance." Shakespeare uses it in Act III, scene ii of Measure for Measure, more or less in
the criminal law sense of"indictment" and in Coriolanus, Act IV, scene vi as a surrogate for
a messenger who bears disturbing news. Several authors observe with despair the insufficiency of the definition given in The Oxford English Dictionary. See, e.g., SCHILLER, supra,
at 28; Bailey J. Korell, Book Note, 9 HARv. J.L. & TECH. 593 (1996) (reviewing SHANNON E.
MARTIN, BITS, BYTES, AND BIG BROTHER: FEDERAL INFORMATION CONTROL IN THE TECHNOLOGICAL AGE (1995)); MICHAEL BUCKLAND, INFORMATION AND INFORMATION SYSTEMS (1991).

Buckland notes that the term is ironically ambiguous. Id. at 3-4.
9. KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES 306 (1979), cited in
MICHAEL PERELMAN, INFORMATION, SOCIAL RELATIONS AND THE ECONOMICS OF HIGH TECHNOLOGY

187 (1991).
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the church's scientific teachings. Would this mean that those reports
were not information, since they did not bring about a reduction, but
rather an increase in uncertainty?
Clearly, few people would now argue that reports of Galileo's observations were not information at the time they were published. This is
not simply a matter of judging the existence of information only after a
few hundred years have passed. Nor is this judgment based upon the
subsequent confirmation of Galileo's observations by centuries of observation and decades of spacecraft. It would be foolish and unworkable to
define information only in terms of what is later determined to be true or
accurate. 10 Would Galileo's reports have been any less "information"
had he been mistaken in what he reported? In contemporary terms, is a
fresh UFO sighting "information"?
To avoid unworkable judgments about the verity of the supposed information, some scholars working within this first approach have taken
the position that information is something that signals to the recipient
some altered state of probability about the state of the world. Acknowledging that nobody knows the true state of the world, but that everyone
manages to live within a broadly defined probability function encompassing all plausible states of the world, this group of theorists means by
information anything entering a person's consciousness in such a manner as to change that person's probability estimates of the world's
state.1 1 In less technical terms, information is anything that changes
how people view the world, however slightly.
The second major approach to defining information diverts focus
away from the effect of the information on the recipient towards some
inherent quality of data itself. One scholar chooses to measure information in units called infons, which is something like a quantum particle of
information, just as a photon is a quantum particle of light. 12 Given that
economists, not particle physicists, have written most of the accessible
literature on information, infons unsurprisingly bear a strong resem10. See generally Buckland, supra note 8, at 3-4. Buckland argues that truth is irrelevant, largely on the basis that it is unknowable. Id.
11. "In general, we could say that an information structure contains three elements:
the set of possible states of the world, the set of possible signals, and the probability that a
signal is observed given that a state prevails." Louis PHLIPS, THE ECONOMICS OF IMPERFECT INFORMATION 2 (1988).
12. KEITH DEVLIN, LOGIC AND INFORMATION (1991). In what is perhaps a scientificallyphrased reference to Arrow's remark about information as that which reduces uncertainty,
Devlin also remarks that information may be related in some fundamental way to entropy.
See id. Entropy, a term from physics, including the Second Law of Thermodynamics, can
be understood as an information concept as well, since information is, in some sense, a
measure of the degree of order of any system. A completely random system - chaos - contains no information, whereas a system that is somewhat ordered contains some observable
information.
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blance to utiles. 13 In response to the old question about whether a falling tree in an unpopulated forest makes a sound, such theorists would
give a resounding "yes."14 Some authors suggest definitions of information as data 15 and one even goes so far as to call information an intrinsic
quality of the universe, 1 6 ignoring altogether the role of human
recipients.
A third major approach looks at information as process - one stage
in the rendering of raw observation or data into intelligible or even
meaningful messages to particular or generic observers. Thus, one author identifies information as the second stage of the sequence from data
to information to knowledge to wisdom. 17 Another, after a review of the
relevant literature, notes that "a multitude of management textbooks refer to 'information' as being 'data which has been processed in order to
make it useful."' " 8 A third argues that the word information refers to no
object, just as there is no tangible correlative to the word "walk." This
scholar proposes instead that information is anything that informs. 19
"Information is an activity of change" 2 0-revealing the process approach
as being very similar to the position that information is that which
reduces uncertainty.
One scholar neatly sums up these three possibilities by providing
21
names to what he sees as the principal uses of the term "information":
e "Information-as-process" - the act of informing,
13. Utiles are the fundamental unit of utility employed by economists to permit them
to apply uniform logical and mathematical functions to the broadly-ranging sets of preferences that particular actors may have when confronted with choices of goods or actions. In
effect, utiles render preferences discrete and comparable.
14. See generally Jim Gilligan, Patternson Glass: The Language of Games of Information, in PHILOSOPHICAL ASPECTS OF INFORMATION SYSTEMS 65 (R.L. Winder, et al., eds.,
1997). Gilligan notes that the equation of information with data that brings about a
change in the subject raises and fails to resolve these tree-in-forest questions. Id. at 67.
15. See, e.g., ROGER G. NOLL, THE ECONOMICS OF INFORMATION: A USER's GUIDE 26-27
(Institute for Information Studies 1993). Noll identifies three types of information: (i)
"facts about reality"; (ii) some objective fact or conceptual model that reduces uncertainty
about how the world works, perhaps by improving human decisions"; and (iii) communication that is value by the sender or receiver, perhaps exclusively as an end in itself." Id. See
also Gilligan, supra note 14. Gilligan offers that data and information are synonymous in
some scholars' works, but rejects this view as too narrow. Id. at 66.
16. Devlin, supra note 12.
17. ROBERT W. LucKY, SILICON DREAMs: INFORMATION, MAN, AND MACHINE (1989).

18. Fenton F. Robb, Some Philosophicaland Logical Aspects of Information Systems,
in PHILOSOPHICAL ASPECTS OF INFORMATION SYSTEMS 11 (R.L. Winder et al. eds., 1997).
19. See Gilligan, supra note 14. Thus, "walking" has meaning in referring to a particular type of action, but "walk" as a noun has no referent in reality and is merely a grammatically convenient restructuring of "walking." Id.
20. Id.
21. Buckland, supra note 10, at 3-4.
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" "Information-as-knowledge" - that which is communicated by the act
of informing, and
* "Information-as-thing" - the objects capable of providing knowledge
through the application of process.
The definition this Article shall adopt will be narrower than, but
consistent with, this range of scholarly usage. As this Article is, ultimately, about the provision of access to official information for social,
political, and economic functioning 2 2 - transparency - this Article defines information as that processed data which bears a reasonablepossibility of altering the world perception of someone receiving the data.
For present purposes, this definition has several merits. First, it
falls within the mainstream thinking of information scholars, in its use
of modification of an observer's consciousness as one major definitional
element. It does not, however, require an actual observer before dignifying data with the name of information, so long as data is of the type that
could reasonably alter an observer's perception of the world. The need to
identify actual observers would prove unnecessarily burdensome in developing a policy of prospective provision of official information to the
public.
Second, this definition does not identify raw data as information, but
requires some element of processing. Some element of thought is necessarily implicated in the processing, whether with respect to the data itself or in order to create a processing template for this sort of data.
Within the context of transparency, raw (unprocessed) data presents too
chaotic and burdensome a variant of information to provide material for
23
effective social, political, and economic discourse.
Third, this definition introduces an element of "reasonable possibility." Unlike many more technical works in information theory, 2 4 this Article is attempting to confront a real-world problem 25 - exploring
whether and why information about official actions and functions should
22. "The seeking, the acquiring, and the supplying of information is best understood as
an economic and political activity . . . ." Id. at 127.
23. "Perhaps information is best described in terms of organization,implying that organization per se is the intellectual effort that manufactures information out of such raw
material as observation. The more the organization, the higher the level of information. In
contrast, where there is total disorder there is no information." Lucky, supra note 17, at
20.
24. It is worth noting, however, Buckland's remarks about "Information-as-thing":
"[Tihe term information is commonly and reasonably used to denote some population of
objects to which some significant probability of being usefully informative in the future has
been attributed." Buckland, supra note 10, at 51-52. Thus, for Buckland, our operating
definition of information forms a portion of his fuller definition.
25. Schiller, supra note 8, at 29, notes that early information theorists encountered
difficulties in applying their work to actual social situations, due to the excessively rigid
formalisms required by the "rigorous codifications" of the theory.
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be provided to the public. In a world of limited budgets and practical
needs, reasonableness is an important constraint on any call for official
action.
In defining information as that processed data which bears a reasonable possibility of altering the world perception of someone receiving the
data, this Article is making no claim to present an exclusive definition.
That is, more expansive definitions such as those discussed earlier are
completely consistent with this definition and, in other contexts, are certainly more appropriate. That this definition falls comfortably within
those other definitions allows this Article to address its narrow field of
concern more concisely, yet without losing the benefit of the many insights that more encompassing theorists have achieved.
Such a definition is consistent with use of the term "information" in
legal literature. Most recently, draft Article 2B of the Uniform Commercial Code attempted to make such a definition. In that draft, section 2B102(22) defined "information" as follows:
(22) 'Information' means data, text, images, sounds, and works of authorship, including computer programs, databases, literary, musical or
works, audiovisual works, motion pictures, mask works, or the like, and
any intellectual property or other rights in information.
Note that this draft definition encompasses raw data which has been
processed and embodied in some medium. What is unclear is whether
the final "or other rights in information" goes beyond this embodiment
requirement and renders the definition significantly broader than the
working definition embodied in this Article. In a related provision, section 2B-103(c), the draft states that:
If a transaction involves both information and goods, this article applies
to the information and to the physical medium containing the information, its packaging, and its documentation ....
This suggests that the drafters were making a distinction between the
information embodied in some form and the embodiment itself. Such a
distinction is, once again, consistent with the working definition used in
this Article, even though the Article 2B definitions leave aspects of the
definition uncertain. 26 In this regard, Article 2B is not unlike the broad
range of federal statutes seeking to deal with information. 27 Even in
26. "In all, the Article 2B debate is remarkably thoughtful, and yet, like most discussions about information policy, uses language about 'information,' the 'network,' and a 'digital economy' as if these words refer to something already well understood." Peter Lyman,
The Article 2B Debate and the Sociology of the Information Age, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
1063, 1067 (1998).
27. "Statutes restricting public access to information, the author argues, suffer from a
legislative failure to define 'information'. The government's resulting vacillation between
controlling information content and controlling information carriers leads to inconsistent
...enforcement of, and confusing modifications to, these statutes." Korell, supra note 8, at
29. Similarly, "the author discusses impediments to the creation of effective legislation to
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New Zealand, a country which has a strong history of information legislation, the term has been problematic:
In 1987, the public sector coverage of the [New Zealand Official Information] Act was extended in the Local Government Official Information
and Meetings Act .

.

. to include all local authorities ....

The word

'information' is not defined in either Act but is meant to be interpreted
in its broadest sense. Indeed, the Danks Committee [on Official Information] intended 'information' to include not only recorded data, but
also knowledge of a fact
or state of affairs by officers of an agency in
28
their official capacity.
III.

WHAT IS TRANSPARENCY?

An increasingly important term in information theory and law is
"transparency."29 Transparency appears as a term of art in the scholarly
literature of many fields 30 - corruption, 3 1 disarmament and arms control,3 2 economic development, 33 environmental protection, 34 financial
combat genetic discrimination. These include: (1) the difficulty of defining 'genetic information,' given the variety of information with genetic significance . . . ." Michael S. Yesley,
Protecting Genetic Difference, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 653 (1998).
28. John M. Howells, The Privacy Act of 1993: A New Zealand Approach, 17 CoMP.

LAB. L.J. 107, 109 (1995).
29. A subjective review of the professional literature on transparency, encompassing
hundreds of references to the term in the literature of law, economics, information theory,
and political economics, reveals few discussions of the term "transparency" before the
1980's, with a number of significant works relating to transparency during the 1980's and a
vastly larger number of references appearing in the 1990's.
30. "Transparency is a flexible concept used in a variety of contexts, from financial
disclosure requirements to anti-corruption measures." EDWIN REKOSH, IN THE PUBLIC EYE:
PARLIAMENTARY TRANSPARENCY IN EUROPE AND NORTH AMERICA 1 (1995).
31. Id.; see also ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, 1997, supra note 4, at 32; Edgardo Boeninger, Governance and Development: Issues and Constraints,267 Proc. of the [1991] World
Bank Ann. Conf. On Development Economics (1992). "Corruption can undermine the effectiveness of institutions. Implementation [of policies] will improve if procedures are trans-

parent, opportunities and incentives for fraud are reduced, and officials are held
accountable." Id. at 284.
32. See, e.g., GILL & MAK, supra note 5 (discussing disarmament and security in
South-East Asia); GILL ET AL., supra note 5 (discussing arms trade in ASEAN countries);
WILLIAM C. POTTER VERIFICATION AND ARMS CONTROL 1985 (identifying approaches to verification in international arms control); UNITED NATIONS, STUDY SERIES 24: STUDY ON WAYS
AND MEANS OF PROMOTING TRANSPARENCY IN INTERNATIONAL TRANSFERS OF CONVENTIONAL
ARMS (discussing control of international transfers of conventional arms).
33. See, e.g. ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, 1998, supra note 2 (noting regulatory encour-

agement of private sector development);

CROSS,

supra note 3 (referring to economic devel-

opment of poor communities in South Africa); PILLAI, supra note 3 (discussing economic

development and governance in Malaysia).
34. Spaulding, supra note 6 (noting public participation in international environmental issues); Konrad von Moltke, DisputeResolution and TransparencyENVIRONMENTAL PRO-
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markets, 3 5 governance, 36 international organizations, 3 7 political economy, 38 regulation, 39 and trade. 40 A review of how transparency is deTECTION AGENCY REP. No. 100-R-93-002(1993) (reviewing dispute resolution in
international environmental issues).
35. See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION OF SECURITIES COMMISSIONS, REPORT OF
THE TECHNICAL COMMITTEE ON SCREEN-BASED TRADING SYSTEMS FOR DERIVATIVE PRODUCTS

(1990) (tracing the development of high-technology trading systems).
36. See, eg., Banks supra note 5 (providing a proposal of domestic agencies to identify
and assess government programs of industrial assistance); BARRY P. BOSWORTH AND GUR
OFER, REFORMING PLANNED ECONOMICS IN AN INTEGRATING WORLD ECONOMY, 1995 (dis-

cussing reform of centrally-planned economies); Boeninger, supra note 31 (developing policies to increase official accountability); Jacques Diouf, Comment on Governance and the
External Factor, in Pierre Landell-Mills and Ismail Serageldin, Governance and the External Factor, 303 Proc. of the [1991] World Bank Ann. Conf. On Development Economics
(1992) (expressing concern over Western hegemony over governance theory); Vaclav Havel,
Address at the Czech Parliament(1987) (partial translation on file with author) (presenting
governance goals in the Czech Republic); George Kopits and Jon Craig, Transparency in
Government Operations, INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 158 (1998) (promoting good practices in governance); Joan M. Nelson, Comment on the Governance and Development 292293 (1992) (reviewing Boeninger, supra note 31) (responding to Boeninger's remarks); PILLAI, supra 3 note (noting economic development and governance in Malaysia); Rekosh,
supra note 30 (noting parliamentary procedures in Europe and North America).
37. E.g., Banks, supra note 5 (reviewing the workings of the GATT Trade Policy Review Mechanism); International Monetary Fund, Study Group Report: Transparency and
Evaluation (1998) [hereinafter IMF Study Group] (reviewing the workings of the International Monetary Fund); Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, How to Promote the InternationalRule
of Law: Contributions by the World Trade Organization Appellate Review System, 1 J.
INT'L. ECON. LAW. 25 (1998) (reviewing the workings of the WTO Appellate Body); Qureshi,
supra note 5 (reviewing the workings of the GATT Trade Policy Review Mechanism).
38. E.g., AVINASH K. DIXIT, MUNICH LECTURES IN ECONOMICS: A TRANSACTION-COST
POLITICS PERSPECTIVE (MIT Press - Munich lectures in Economics 1996) (discussing the
development of political and economic policy).
39. E.g., ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, 1997, supra note 4 (analyzing the regulatory approaches to utilities in developing Asian economies); Chayes, supra note 3 (noting international regulatory agreements); Mestmacker, supra note 6 (discussing regulation of natural
gas pricing in Europe).
40. See, e.g., George Eads & Edward M. Graham, Transparency:A Prerequisitefor Positive Adjustment, OECD OBSERVER (Nov. 1982) (encouraging development of domestic reports on trade distortions); Fritz Leutwiler, et al., Trade Policiesfor a Better Future, GATT
SECRETARIAT (1985), partially reprintedin 0. Long, Public Scrutiny of Protection:Domestic
Policy Transparency and Trade Liberalization, Appendix 1 (Gower for the Trade Policy
Research Centre 1989) (promoting international approaches to combating protectionism);
0. LONG, PUBLIC SCRUTINY OF PROTECTION: DOMESTIC TRANSPARENCY AND TRADE LIBERALIZATION (1989) (providing a development of domestic means for countering protectionism);
DUCK-Woo NAM, ET AL., WHEN THE GOING GETS TOUGH: NEED FOR EARLY PROGRESS IN THE

URUGUAY ROUND (1989) (fostering of productive trade negotiations); OECD, supra note 2
(developing means of assessing trade subsidies); JAIME SERRA, ET AL., REFLECTIONS ON RE-

(1997) (reviewing trends in
regional trade agreements); United States General Accounting Office, State TradingEnterprises: Compliance with the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GOA/GGD-95-208)
(1995) (reporting problems involving state trading enterprises); United States General AcGIONALISM: REPORT ON THE STUDY ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE
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fined and used across this spectrum of disciplines will both enlighten this
Article and demonstrate why there is a need for a coherent analytical
framework for considering information law, in general, and transparency, in particular.
There are several elements to how the relevant literature treats
transparency. The first element is that transparency arises in the context of governmental and organizational action. Thus, the term may
arise in relation to governments and government officials, 4 1 international/intergovernmental organizations, 42 or private bureaucracies or
corporate enterprises working under government programs 4 3 or supervicounting Office, U.S. - Chilean Trade: PesticideStandards and Concerns Regarding Chilean Sanitary Rules (GOA/GGD-94-198) (1994) (reviewing Chilean phytosanitary
regulations in US-Chilean trade).
41. Rekosh, supra note 30 at 1, notes that the term "transparency" "has taken on a
particular meaning with respect to law-making bodies, where transparent procedures are
necessary to ensure the political accountability of those enacting legislation." Id. The 1997
GATT Appellate Body decision regarding US restrictions on imports of cotton and manmade fiber underwear from Costa Rica, WT/DS24/ABR (Feb. 10, 1997), stressed the importance of transparency with respect to "governmental acts":
Article X:2 [of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade] may be seen to embody a principle of fundamental importance - that of promoting full disclosure of
governmental acts affecting Members and private persons and enterprises,
whether of domestic or foreign nationality. The relevant policy principle is widely
known as the principle of transparency and has obviously due process dimensions.
The essential implication is that Members and other persons affected, or likely to
be affected, by governmental measures imposing restraints, requirements and
other burdens, should have a reasonable opportunity to acquire authentic information about such measures and accordingly to protect and adjust their activities or
alternatively to seek modification of such measures.
Id. See Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, How to Promote the InternationalRule of Law: Contributions by the World Trade OrganizationAppellate Review System, 1 J. INT'L. ECON. LAW
25,45 (1998). See also PILLAI, supra note 3. Likewise, Pillai talks of transparency with
respect to "government policy," id. at 36, and "public officials, including local authorities,"
id. at 37 (both statements of.law professor Shad Saleem Faruqi, of the Mara Institute of
Technology in Malaysia), and of starting with "the top, with the authorities." Id. at 113
(statement of Mr. Azzat Kamaluddin, a member of the Securities Commission of Malaysia). United Nations, supra note 32, addresses the transparency regarding military matters [1 14, p. 4], a central governmental activity. Similarly, AsIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK,
1998, supra note 2, addresses transparency as "a requirement of regulators," id. at 21, and
AsIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, 1997, supra note 4, points out that transparency is necessary
"to increase confidence in the legitimacy of a government." Id. at 34 (quoting Ms. Ruth
Richardson, former finance minister of New Zealand).
42. Chayes, supra note 3, looks at 'the policies and activities ... of any central organs
of the [treaty] regime, in addition to those of 'the parties to the treaty.'" Id. at 135. Similarly, IMF Study Group 1998, supra note 37, considers the transparency of procedures of
the IMF.
43. CRoss, supra note 3, reviews the transparency of both state and private sector development agencies operating under a variety of South African government programs.
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sion.4 Given the bureaucratic involvement in all these uses of "transparency," the focus of this Article on governmental provision of
information is within the range of professional discussion of official
activity.
The second element that is common to the diverse literature on
transparency is that it involves the availability of information. Sometimes, this is expressed as a duty to make information available to those
who seek it4 5 or a general requirement of visibility of information. 46 In
other sources, a more active stance is described. 47 This commences with
48
a concern for information processing.
The third element involves the audience for or recipients of the information provided or made available. Often, the referent group is the pub44. For example, the design of a computer-based trading system for investment derivatives involves having a self-regulatory private bureaucracy design a transparent system of
reporting about "open or unexpected orders and completed transactions" that is capable of
satisfying regulatory authorities. INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION OF SECURITIES COMMISSIONS, supra note 35, at 8. Similarly, Mestmicker, supra note 6, at 748, considers the price
transparency requirements that are appropriate to place upon natural gas providers under
European Community regulatory structures.
45. Chayes, supra note 3, defines transparency, in part, as "the availability and accessibility of knowledge and information. .. ." Id. at 135. CROSS, supra note 3, talks of transparency as having "access to information." Id. at 3. INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION OF
SECURITIES COMMISSIONS, supra note 35, states that "[t]he term 'transparency' refers to the
extent to which relevant information is available in the system . . . ." Id. at 8.
46. See generally 0. Long, PUBLIC SCRUTINY OF PROTECTION: DOMESTIC POLICY TRANSPARENCY AND Trade Liberalization (1989). According to Long, transparency "refers to the
visibility of effects. . . ." Id. Similarly, Nam Duck-Woo states that "transparent policies observable and comprehensible ones - are more likely to be in the general interest than
those that are hidden from public scrutiny." Nam Duck-Woo, et al., When the Going Gets
Tough: Need for Early Progress in the Uruguay Round (prepared for the fourth AsianPacific Trade Conference, held in Bali, on 8-10 January 1988, hosted by the Government of
Indonesia) (Trade Policy Research Centre 1989).
47. Thus, the United Nations, supra note 32, defines transparency in arms control settings as "involving systematic provision of information on specific aspects of activities . ... "
Id. at 14, p.4. Mestmaicker, supra note 6, talks about "the obligation on the part of undertakings to make known the prices they charge in certain transactions." Id. at 748. Similarly AAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, 1998, supra note 2, inquires into whether major
regulatory decisions and reasonings are published, not merely made available to those who
inquire about them, id. Annex 1, at 2-3, and describes "a requirement on regulators to
explain their decisions and processes." Id. at 21.
48. "Access to information is not simply a matter of permissive or prohibitive laws but
also of the proper organization, systematisation, storage and retrieval of information." PILLAI, supra note 3, at 37 (statement of law professor Shad Saleem Faruqi, of the Mara Institute of Technology in Malaysia). See also Joan M. Nelson, Comment on "Governanceand
Development,"by Boeninger, 289 Proc. of the [1991] World Bank Ann. Conf. On Development Economics (1992) (reviewing Boeninger, supra note 31). Similarly, Nelson states that
transparency includes "collection and dissemination of much fuller information [than previously available], and a free press." Id. at 292-293.
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lic. 4 9 In other cases, parties with a defined relationship to the
information are those for whom transparency is sought. 50 Sometimes, a
more generic term is used for interested parties with informational
interests. 5 1
The fourth element of "transparency" involves fundamental accuracy and clarity. This may take the form of concern over the presentation of data. 5 2 It may be expressed in broad requirements that
information be, for example, "observable and comprehensible" 5 3 and
"readily understandable," 54 or by reference to its "quality and completeness" 55 or "essential meaning."5 6 Alternatively, this element may be expressed with reference to its effect upon those who receive the
information, in terms of their ease of understanding5 7 or the ability of
the target audience to make use of the information, particularly in holding government officials accountable. 58 For a prominent economist,
49. CROSS, supra note 3, writes of "the principle that the development process should
be open and public," id. at 14, and describes the proper beneficiaries of transparency as
"community members." Id. at 3. OECD, supra note 2, refers to "the general public" as the
intended audience for "external transparency." Id. at 10. Similarly ASIAN DEVELOPMENT
BANK, 1998, supra note 2, asks whether documents are "in the public domain" Id. Annex
1, at 2. PILLAI, supra note 3, inquires about the information available to citizens: "How is a
citizen expected to know what laws bind him, what procedures apply to him unless the
existence of the laws is known and their availability assured?" Id. at 37 (statement of law
professor Shad Saleem Faruqi, of the Mara Institute of Technology in Malaysia).
50. In interpreting the transparency principle of GATT Article X:2, the 1997 GATT
Appellate Body decision regarding US restrictions on imports of cotton and man-made fiber
underwear from Costa Rica, supra note 41, expressed concern for the informational interests of GATT "Members and other persons affected, or likely to be affected, by governmental measures.. . ." Id. See Petersmann, supra note 41, at 45. In a similar functional vein,
OECD, supra note 3, states, "'Internal' transparency refers to the quality and completeness
of information available to decision-makers within governments . . . ." Id. at 10.
51. Thus, the IMF Study Group, supra note 37, refers to the transparency interests of
"stakeholders." Id. at 5.
52. See, e.g., Nam, supra note 40, at 65. "The form in which data is presented should
be chosen to maximize its informational value." Id.
53. Id. at 66.
54. PILLAI, supra note 3, at 114 (statement of Mr. Azzat Kamaluddin, a member of the
Securities Commission of Malaysia).
55. OECD, supra note 2, at 10. Similarly, PiLLAI, supra note 3, states: "Transparency,
as I understand it, connotes clarity, ease of understanding and recognition and, most important of all, to my mind, the quality of being candid, open or frank." Id. at 114 (statement
of Mr. Azzat Kamaluddin, a member of the Securities Commission of Malaysia). Readers
may find interesting in this remark the descriptive blending of the effect of transparency on
the recipient and the essential character of the presenter of information.
56. THOMAS M. FRANCK, FAIRNESs IN INTERNATIONAL LAw AND INSTITUTIONS 30 (1995).
57. Long, supra note 46, defines "domestic transparency" as "procedures that provide
for public scrutiny... and that promote domestic understanding.. .. " Id. at 21 (emphasis
added).
58. Rekosh, supra note 30, states that "transparent [legislative] procedures are necessary to ensure the political accountability of those enacting legislation." Id. at 1.
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"[g]reater transparency often makes information more accurate and
more symmetric; therefore it reduces or even eliminates some transac59
tion costs."
What is common among these uses of the term "transparency" is instructive and provides a working definition of transparency that will enlighten this Article's rational choice discussion of information law:
Transparency is a measure of the degree to which the existence, content, or meaning of a law, regulation, action, process, or condition is ascertainable or understandableby a party with reason to be interested in
that law, regulation, action, process, or condition.
This Article deals with official laws, regulations, actions, processes,
and conditions: collectively, official activity. A simple, but fair approximation of the definition of transparency already given would adopt this
linguistic shortcut and place the definition in the context of information:
Transparency is a measure of the degree to which information about
official activity is made available to an interestedparty.
With this definition in mind, this Article may now turn to the task of
identifying rationales for transparency.
IV.

THE INFORMATION MARKETPLACE
A.

1.

MARKET-FAILURE ANALYSIS

Information as Commodity

Information is an odd sort of product:
Is the economic value of information that of a commodity, something
produced for commercial purposes, or is it better understood as a raw
material? If it is not a commodity, is it better conceived of as a flow, a
service, or a utility? Does information itself add value, or is it the innovative use of information that is the origin of economic value? If so, how
might this change the relative position of producers and consumers of
60
information property in an information economy?
A review of the unusual economics of information will elucidate why
traditional conceptions of markets fail to deal properly with the informational needs of society.
With information, there is always an initial cost, which includes
both the acquisition of data and its organization into useful information.
In effect, there is a substantial cost in producing the first copy of the
organized data - the information - and it should come as no surprise
that this is called a "first copy cost."6 1 Once a first copy has been made,
there are dissemination costs associated with producing and distributing
59. Dixit, supra note 38, at 106.
60. Lyman, supra note 26, at 1069.
61. NOLL, supra note 15, at 30.
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additional copies of the same information. 6 2 However, the medium of
the additional copies is usually a fairly minor cost in comparison to the
first copy cost - witness the costs of computer disks as compared to computer programming, paper and printing as opposed to original writing,
and photoreproduction as opposed to painting the Mona Lisa. 63 Furthermore, it is the informational content, not the physical medium in which
it is carried, that most interests the consumer. Ironically, however, one
can duplicate the information merely by reproducing the exact state of
the physical medium. Even with respect to the Mona Lisa, approximate
reproduction of the canvas and paint through photoreproduction will
convey enough of the original information content of the painting to satisfy most casual art lovers.
The sale of information fails to impose a normal cost upon the seller.
The sale of an ordinary good deprives the seller of its use: one who sells a
car to her neighbor no longer has the right to drive it when she pleases.
With information, however, this is not so: 64 one who provides a friend
with a duplicated audiocassette can still listen to the original copy and
one who copies a computer program need not remove it from her own
computer. There is essentially no loss of utility to an information supplier, unless it relates to the exclusiveness in using the information, as
with a trade secret.
A consumer of information incurs additional costs subsequent to acquiring the information-in-a-medium. In order for the consumer to use
the processed data (in the hope of altering her perception of the world),
she must internalize the materials by reading, contemplating or otherwise utilizing them. 6 5 Thus, the real cost to the consumer includes not
just the money to purchase the information, but the time and bother of
using it, which is often far greater. 66 For most readers, the time opportunity cost in reading War and Peace is far greater than the cash cost of
purchasing a copy of the novel. In a real sense, the cost to acquire the
information is typically only a small portion of the cost of using the information. However, producers do not profit from consumers' costs to use
62. Id.
63. Given DaVinci's broad genius, the intellectual opportunity costs of his time and
effort in painting the Mona Lisa were enormous!
64. "Processing ordinarily converts old materials into new. Information processing,
however, can create new information while leaving the old information intact." Buckland,
supra note 21, at 11.
65. "One important characteristic of information is that it necessarily requires time
and effort to internalize, whether the purpose of using it is pure consumption, an increase
in production efficiency, or improved decision making." NOLL, supra note 15, at 29.
66. According to Adam Smith, "[tihe real price of everything, what everything really
costs to the man who wants to acquire it, is the toil and trouble of acquiring it." Adam
Smith, quoted in Buckland, supra note 21, at 129. See also NOLL, supra note 15, at 28-29.
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information, beyond acquisition costs, since none of the consumer's costs
to use information returns to the producer.
Thus, one of the defining characteristics of most commerce in information is the low cost of per-unit reproduction and dissemination compared to first production. Another is that the producer will not profit
from the non-monetary aspect of the consumer's cost to locate, acquire,
and use the information. These are, of course, related phenomena, and
are very familiar in the context of movies, music, and software. The perunit cost of placing the appropriate laser-readable pattern on a compact
disk and packaging it for consumers is inconsequential compared to the
cost of creating and recording the initial video, audio, or programmatic
information. Furthermore, any consumer with a minor investment in
equipment is fully capable of producing another copy for a friend at almost no cost.
This description, of course, is the cottage industry end of piracy,
which cumulatively costs the industries involved billions of dollars each
year in lost revenues. The technological battles to prevent this practice
and the legal issues of intellectual property rights for information products are fascinating. They are also beyond the scope of this Article,
which must content itself with recognizing the essential economics and
public policy concerns of information marketplaces. It is enough to say
that there are often insufficient means available for a producer to obtain
compensation for an initial investment in an information product, despite what may be substantial market demand for the product. There
are likely to be many potential consumers who are willing to pay the perare unwilling to pay any or a
unit distribution costs for their copies, but
67
significant portion of the first-copy costs.
Where there is substantial demand and no workable means to ensure a worthwhile return to anyone producing goods to satisfy the demand, there exists a problem known by the generic term "market
failure." More particularly, this type of market failure is referred to as
68
the failure of the "commons" or the problem of a "public good." "Commons" refers to an old practice of some western European communities of
providing an area of common grazing land for livestock belonging to local
residents. Fortunately, this clever example of early community planning
failed miserably, leaving economists with a wonderful model for market
failure: everyone used the common grazing area first, until it became
worthless. 6 9 Since nobody owned the property, nobody had an incentive
67. NOLL, supra note 15, at 33-35.
68. NOLL, supra note 15, at 36; see Buckland, supra note 10 at 133-135; Perelman,
supra note 9, at 186 (including Arrow and Hayek references).
69. This can be analyzed in terms of the prisoner's dilemma. Garrett Hardin, The
Tragedy of the Commons, Science 162:1244 (1968). See also ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING
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to keep it up or add to it. On a considerably greater scale, this was also
the problem with upkeep of productive property in Soviet countries.
That which is owned by all is cared for by none.
From this historical example, one can observe that the essential
qualities of a public good are those of a desirable product that nobody has
a particular incentive to produce because there is no way to limit, allocate, or regulate its availability. In effect, everyone wants someone else
to produce it, so that they can consume it without significant cost - the
"free rider" problem. The cost structure of information, including the
ease of reproducing it and the fact that it is not lost to a transferor,
makes most forms of information public goods and threatens to make
free riders of most information consumers.
Public goods have certain characteristics. 70 Without means to recover creation and production costs, they are underproduced. With insignificant costs to the consumer to acquire or use them, public goods are
overconsumed. Taken together, these two characteristics describe a
market out of equilibrium, where the forces of supply and demand have
not balanced out. Adam Smith's invisible hand has let public goods, such
as information, slip through its fingers.
B.

MARKETING INFORMATION PRODUCTS

With any public good, a question exists as to how to supply enough of
the product to begin to satisfy the unmet demand. Along with this goes
the companion problem of identifying a mechanism, through price or
otherwise, that will facilitate distribution of the product.
Begin with a model that only slightly deviates from reality. Consider valuable information, like an important database, located on a computer in someone's home. It is possible to provide someone else with a
full copy of that information in an essentially cost-free manner through
modems and subscriptions to unlimited access Internet provider packages. Accepting that approximation as a reality, look at the supply, pricing, and distribution issues surrounding an information product with
high first-copy costs and zero dissemination costs.
No economically sensible party will assume the risks and other costs
of producing a product which has no prospect of repaying those costs
upon sale. Therefore, unless sale of copies of the database will provide
enough revenue to cover the costs, nobody will undertake the data gathering and processing needed to create the first copy of the information.
But who will pay the price?
THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION

(1990); Chayes,

supra note 3, at 147(discussing both works).
70. For discussions expanding upon the remarks in this paragraph, see NOLL, supra
note 15, at 30-40; Buckland supra note 10 at 133-135; Perelman, supra note 9, at 186.
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Once the database is sold to the first consumer, a problem arises.
Subsequent consumers can argue, reasonably, that they should be able
to obtain the information free of charge, assuming that there is no com71
Why? If
petitive or social reason to keep the information confidential.
it does them good to receive the database, costs nothing to obtain it, and
does not deprive any other party of the equivalent opportunity to use the
information, then free distribution of the product will actually advance
social welfare. This logic, of course, applies equally to the first consumer
receiving the already-made information from the originator. Furthermore, what first consumer would be willing to pay all of the first-copy
costs of the information, knowing that other consumers should (and
likely will) receive the same product free?
The result of this analysis, of course, is that there will be no consumers willing to buy the information. Even if a seller re-instates a modest
distribution cost for the information, essentially the same result occurs.
There are still no consumers willing to bear any part of the first-copy
cost, only consumers willing to bear the distribution costs for their own
copies. 72 "If I give you a blank disk, will you give me that computer
game?"
The last remark, and the analysis that led up to it, does not reflect
the entire reality of information marketing, but is a testament to government intervention, including transparency about government operations. Governments provide a variety of supports and protections for
information industries, 7 3 including substantial intellectual property protection. Through various devices, including patents and copyrights, creators of intellectual property are given the right to increase the copying
costs by third parties substantially - pirates must calculate lawsuits and
71. For example, if the database consists of the entire list of corporate customers,
sorted by income and buying preferences; or a list of private parties ordering from a pornographic magazine; or a list of overseas foreign operatives, there are clear reasons for keeping the database confidential. Buckland, supra note 10, notes that:
There may be an advantage in a competitive situation if others remain ignorant or
misinformed. Trade secrets, military intelligence, and advance market information can be beneficial to those privileged to know them.... Such knowledge is a
valuable asset and the expression of the knowledge in the form of information is a
valuable commodity when all of the following conditions are met: there is a competitive situation, the information is instrument (useful for some purpose), and the
information is scarce in the sense of being restricted.
Id. at 135.
72. "[If] the cost of transmitting a given body of information.. . were zero, then optimal allocation would obviously call for unlimited distribution of information without
cost ....
[Any information .. . should, from the welfare point of view, be available free of
charge (apart from the cost of transmitting information)." Arrow, supra note 1, at 614-616,
as quoted in Perelman, supra note 9, at 189.
73. See Peter F. Cowhey & Margaret M. McKeown, The Promise of a New World Information Order, INST. OF INFo. STUD. (1993).
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criminal prosecutions in with the cost of the computer disk. Government
enforcement of such artificial devices as "shrink-wrap" licenses provides
software producers with additional, contractual means of altering the dynamics of the marketplace for certain types of information. 7 4 Even with
these interventions, however, distribution-cost software and music tapes
abound.
Government support of one form or another is an economically appropriate response to market failures of this sort. Few would argue that
production of patentable items would not suffer if the patent laws were
repealed. Another government response to this market failure has been
to support research and development efforts - in effect, subsidizing the
first-copy costs of information. This policy has been most successful
when it has resulted in sale of the information at a price reflecting distribution costs only. Such is the case with the Internet, which began life as
a government-subsidized communication system for a handful of university researchers. Where subsidized research and development has led to
a product that is also protected by patents or other intellectual property
monopolies, consumers have had to pay twice - through the subsidy and
through being charged for the never-incurred first copy costs of the product. It is the failure to follow through with the marketing logic of government support, not the support itself, that is the problem in those
instances.
In sum, the first rationale for government involvement in providing
information lies in the nature of information as a commodity. With high
initial costs and very low distribution costs, there are inherent market
failures built into the information marketplace. Where the information
begins as data generated by governmental operations and held in government files, the argument for government underwriting of the first
copy costs is undeniable. If such information is to enter the world at all,
it must do so at government expense. One logical consequence of the
market's failure to handle information rationally is that governments
need to counteract these market failures. This is especially true where
the government itself creates or initially possesses the information, thus
providing a fundamental rationale for transparency.
Please note that this is not the same as espousing a policy of freedom
of information, such as is embodied in the United States Freedom of Information Act. 75 The policy underlying that act is one of reactive sharing
of information, whereby a government has the responsibility to provide
74. See Joseph C. Wang, Casenote, Procd, Inc., v. Zeidenberg and Article 2B: Finally,
the Validation of Shrink- Wrap Licenses, 16 J. MARSHALL J. COMP. & INFO. L. 439, 456-460
(1997); See also Ann Lousin, The Article 2B Symposium: A Foreward, 16 J. MARSHALL J.
Comp. & INFO. L. 205 (1997).
75. Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1994).
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information in government hands to those who request it (except with
respect to specified exceptions). The policy discussion in this Article is
significantly broader than that - that there is a governmental responsibility to be proactive in providing society with substantial information
about its own, and the society's, functioning. Although the full scope of
what information should be provided must await a longer and more thorough work in this area, it would be fair to compare the approach of FOIA
to the fuller and more proactive stances of the environmental impact
statement required under the National Environmental Policy Act 76 or
the prospectus requirements on corporate issuers of securities under the
Securities Act of 1933. 7 7 In fact, the scope of governmental provision of
information argued for in this article goes beyond these two examples, in
that they require information to be provided whenever certain actions
are contemplated, whereas the policy consequences of the arguments
made in this Article would require provision of information in government hands merely because it is in government hands and is of value to
society - transparency in government operations.
V.

POLITICAL SIGNALING ANALYSIS

A second rationale for governmental transparency lies in the signals
such a policy sends to the world. This section considers the concept of
signaling, with heavy reliance upon the work of game theorists who have
analyzed this concept, and addresses the relationship of signaling to official policies of transparency.
Signaling is a term that has found currency in rational choice analysis based upon mathematical game theory. As this Article's author has
discussed at length in an earlier work, 78 signaling describes the transmission of information from one party to another in conditions where
various players in a competitive game must operate in conditions of less
79
than full knowledge. Examples of signaling include bidding in bridge,
80
8
bluffing in poker, and finishing a degree in job hunting. ' In each case,
76. National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1994).
77. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77a (1994).
78. William B.T. Mock, Game Theory, Signalling,and InternationalLegal Relations,
26 G. WASH. J. INT'L. L. & ECON. 33 (1992).
79. JOHN VON NEUMANN & OSKAR MORGENSTERN, THEORY OF GAMES AND ECONOMIC
BEHAVIOR 16.4.2, 6.4.3, at 52-55 (1953) (noting general discussion of signaling in both
bridge and poker). It is assumed throughout this article that readers are familiar with
bridge and poker. For those readers who are not familiar with these games, however, a
basic discussion of the fundamental concepts can be found in EDMOND HOYLE, HOYLE'S
RULES OF GAMES: DESCRIPTIONS OF INDOOR GAMES OF SKILL AND CHANCE,
WITH ADVICE ON SKILLFUL PLAY 1-33, 34-63 (Albert H. Morehead & Geoffrey MottSmith eds., 2d ed. 1983) (discussing the rules of bridge and poker, respectively).
80. Von Neumann, supra note 79, at 188-189 (analyzing of signaling in the context of
bluffing in poker).
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the party taking the action does so with the intent of conveying some
information, whether true or not, to others involved in the communal
activity.
A closer look at these three examples will reveal some useful
concepts.
In bridge, every bid - say by the person sitting as East - conveys
information to the other three people, sitting as East's partner, West,
and as East's opponents, sitting as North and South. Within a game theoretic analysis of a bridge game, one can say that East-West is one
"player" with two personae, competing against a similarly bifurcated
North-South "player." Because the two human halves of each player do
not share all their knowledge with each other, it becomes necessary to
hold an "internal" conversation that can be overheard by the opponent.
Without such a conversation, the East-West player cannot know what
bridge contract holds the greatest promise for scoring points. Clearly,
there are times when such an internal conversation is highly valuable for
producing consistent and rewarding behavior. Indeed, management theory includes analyses of methods of achieving worthwhile information
82
flows within organizations.
In poker, each person is a distinct player, with rather immediate
financial conflict with each other player. Because of the betting element
of poker, each player necessarily engages in a formalized conversation
with all other players - a conversation that reveals, or purports to reveal,
something about the quality of the player's hand. If a player actually
wished to reveal the true quality of her hand, she could simply (and unconventionally) show all the other players her cards. Obviously, this naive approach is not a winning poker strategy. Instead, the informational
aim of the communications made during betting includes misdirection.
Without bluffing, strong bets would indicate strong hands. It is only by
bluffing, or engaging in false signaling, that the information content of a
betting pattern can be obscured sufficiently to make the game of poker
strategically interesting and the winning of large pots possible.
It is well established that college graduates can expect, on average,
significantly higher lifetime earnings than those without college degrees.
Indeed, there are many jobs that are only open to college graduates.
What is intriguing about these statistics is that, broadly speaking, it
does not matter what a graduate's major was, either in lifetime earnings
81. See infra note 83.
82. See Michael L.Tushman and David A. Nadler, Information Processingas an Integrating Concept in OrganizationalDesign, 3 ACAD. OF MGMT. REV. 213 (1978) (applying
information processing analysis to the question of appropriate organizational structure);
ROLAND KEMPE HOPE, SR., DEVELOPMENT IN THE THIRD WORLD: FROM POLICY FAILURE TO

POLICY REFORM 147 (1996) (discussing of the informational role of feedback in administrative reform).
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or in landing that first job.8 3 What appears to matter is simply that the
job applicant finished college. This implies that the actual studies undertaken are seen by employers as largely irrelevant, so long as the applicant has demonstrated the intelligence and perseverance to complete
a college degree. That is to say, the act of obtaining a college diploma is a
signal to potential employers, independent of any information about actual courses taken. College graduates put themselves through four or
more years of hard work, at significant expense and opportunity cost,
largely for the sake of distinguishing themselves from their less intelligent or less dedicated counterparts among high school graduates.8 4 The
stability of this signaling pattern reveals it as what is referred to by
economists and game theorists as a separating equilibrium,8 5 involving
the use of a signal to distinguish oneself from those for whom the signal
is too onerous to send.
Bridge, poker, and the education-employment link reveal three very
useful aspects of information and signaling: internal signaling, false signaling, and signals as separating equilibria. All three of these bear upon
the issue of governmental transparency.
In today's world, governments are responsible for a wide array of
regulatory functions. In order to perform such functions in a proper and
consistent manner, different branches of government need to share information with each other. The grand experiment of centralized planning
begun with the Russian revolution ended in administrative failure because, at least in part, of the inability of the Soviet bureaucracy to keep
up with its own information needs.8 6 Information flow from each corner
83. Much of this paragraph is based upon an analysis of the separating equilibrium
function of higher education set forth in Phlips, supra note 7, at 123-128 and MICHAEL
SPENCE, MARKET SIGNALING: INFORMATIONAL TRANSFER IN HIRING AND RELATED SCREENING

PROCESSES (Harvard U.P. 1974).
84. Unfortunately, financial capacity varies among high school graduates, too, so that
the signal is clouded somewhat: failure to obtain a college degree may relate to access to
capital rather than lack of characteristics that employers would deem desirable. In game
theoretic terms, this would be a major argument in favor of broadly available student loans
and grants - to clarify the educational signal for the after-degree marketplace.
85. See Phlips, supra note 7 (dealing with separating equilibria in chapter five).
86. Consider: Tushman, supra note 82, writing of the needs of organizations, including
governments, for good internal flows of information:
[A] critical task of the organization is to facilitate the collection, gathering, and
processing for information about how different components of the organization are
functioning, about quality of outputs, and about conditions in external technological and market domains. In short, organizations must develop information
processing mechanisms capable of dealing with both external and internal sources
of uncertainty.
Id. at 614, and ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, 1998, supra note 2, writing of the information
flow within certain types of governments: "In centrally-planned economies, and also in
heavily corporatist systems found in some developing Asian economies, economic regulation is carried out by Ministries ....
The key point about such regulatory systems is their
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of the government is important both for the potential utility of the information itself and as an internal signal to other branches of government
that they can expect informational cooperation. If any branch hesitates
to share its information with other branches of government, this internal
signaling has significance not just for the information given or not given,
but for the uncooperative attitude that other branches can expect to see
in the future.
Many people do not trust governments, in general, or their own governments, in particular. Whatever they hear from governments is suspect and is viewed with little more credence than the bids of a poker
player might be viewed. In order to prevent government communications from being dismissed as mere false signaling, a consistent pattern
of credible signaling must be established by the government. Both bad
decision-makers and conspiracy theorists thrive under conditions of inadequate information. The best way to combat suspicion of false signaling is to provide a consistent record of information flow.
A consistent pattern of government provision of information also
serves to separate open governments from those unwilling to be open
with their people. In a government riddled with autocracy, corruption,
or incompetence, an open information policy would be unwelcome. A
strong flow of information about government operations would undermine the government's pattern of operation by creating public pressure
for democracy, integrity, and efficiency. In effect, the cost to government
officials of open information would be too high for them to want to provide it. Since only governments that are already essentially democratic,
honest, and efficient can afford to provide open access to information
about government operations, the act of providing such information necessarily separates such governments from those lacking these features.
The need for transparency and open information policies is not limited to the executive branch of a government. Without the clarity of
transparent opinions, courts would not be trusted.8 7 Legislatures must
opaqueness." Id. at 10-11. Finally, Gregory Grossman, Command Economy, in THE NEW
PALGRAVE: PROBLEMS OF THE PLANNED ECONOMY 59 (John Eatwell, et al., eds., W.W. Norton
1990):
A major problem [with command economies] is that detailed planning and the corresponding directives may lack the requisite information, often cannot be effectively coordinated, and owing to their rigidity are peculiarly vulnerable to
uncertainty. Information in the command sector tends to flow vertically, up and
down, rather than horizontally, between buyer and seller, adding to difficulties of
demand-supply coordination.... Even at best, this manner of resource allocation
can hope to attain only internal consistency... but not a high order of economic
efficiency.
Id.
87. "[The] Court was faithful to the democratic tradition [when it] wrote in words that
all could understand why it did what it did. That is vital to the integrity of the judicial
process." W. Douglas, Stare Decisis: Eighth Annual Benjamin N. Cardozo Lecture to the
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operate openly, to command respect and obedience for the laws they produce.88 Supranational governmental structures are equally subject to
the call for transparency89
In sum, transparency about government operations serves three important signaling functions. Internally, transparency signals that interdepartment cooperation may be expected and strong and cooperative results obtained from government operations. Externally, transparency
undercuts public fears of false signaling and distortion, thereby limiting
conflict between the government and the public. Finally, transparency
serves to separate essentially sound governments from those which cannot afford to provide transparency about government operations.
VI.

POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY ANALYSIS

The third rationale for government involvement in providing information - for governmental transparency - lies in the need for political
accountability of governments. Transparency separates sound governments from those that are less sound. Not only does a policy of transparency identify those governments with sound policies, but such a
policy also serves to keep those governments accountable and productive.
Transparency about government operations and the finances of government officials is a primary means of deterring corruption and of uncovering it when it occurs. "Corruption can undermine the effectiveness
of institutions. Implementation [of policies] will improve if procedures
are transparent, opportunities and incentives for fraud are reduced, and
officials are held accountable." 90 It is no accident that a major non-governmental organization in the global fight against official corruption is
Association of the Bar of the City of New York 12 (1949). See also JOSEPH

GOLDSTEIN, THE

INTELLIGIBLE CONSTITUTION: THE SUPREME COURT'S OBLIGATIONS TO MAINTAIN THE CONSTI-

(Oxford U.P. 1992). Goldstein
quotes Justice Douglas on p. 6 as part of a book-long argument that the United States
Supreme Court has a responsibility for rendering clear decisions, even in cases of disagreement among members of the Court.
88. Rekosh, supra note 30.
89. "The Bank cannot promote good governance among its member governments unless the Bank itself effectively embodies the principles of transparency, predictability, accountability, and participation. The Bank has become a more open and pro-active
institution in recent years, adopting in 1994 a broad-ranging new Disclosure of Information
policy . . . ." Asian Development Bank, Law and Develoopment Seminar Proceedings:A
record of the proceedingsof a seminarheld in Manila Philippineson 29 August 1996 during
the 29th Annual Meeting of the Board of Governors of the Asian Development Bank (1996)
[hereinafter Asian Development Bank, Seminar 1996] (statement of Mr. Barry Metzger,
Asian Development Bank General Counsel).
TUTION AS SOMETHING WE THE PEOPLE CAN UNDERSTAND

90. Boeninger, supra note 31, at 284.
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called Transparency International. 9 1 In the United States, such laws as
the Freedom of Information Act,9 2 the federal lobbying act, 9 3 and the
acts and practices requiring disclosure of the private finances of public
officials 94 all speak to this truth. Similarly, the New Zealand Official
Information Act 9 5 is an example of a statute embodying a degree of official transparency regarding governmental operations. This link between
increased transparency and decreased corruption is true throughout the
world:
Advisor to the Prime Minister Khalid Anwer of Pakistan raised a significant problem largely undiscussed in the morning presentations: the
presence of corruption and graft as an impediment to economic development and prosperity, a growing problem in a number of the countries of
the region. He related the problem of corruption and graft directly to a
lack of transparency in legal and governmental processes, arbitrary official behavior, and unstructured governmental processes. 9 6
Even more broadly, transparency has value in preventing and revealing rent-seeking. Bribery is, in a sense, only the unacceptable end of
an entire spectrum of lobbying activities, all of which are forms of rentseeking and none of which is truly productive for society.
In economic terms, "rent" is the excess benefit available from inefficiencies or structural problems in the marketplace. 9 7 Thus, an unregulated monopolist is able to charge a "monopoly rent" to its customers at a
level just low enough to prevent a new market entrant from disturbing
91. Transparency International is an international NGO dedicated to the elimination
of corruption in developing countries through encouragement of principles of transparency
and the components of effective national systems for governmental integrity. Transparency International has a home page at <http://www.is.in-berlin.de/Service/ti.html>, and
its "corruption perceptions index" also appears on the World Wide Web at <http://www.unigoettingen.de/-uwvw/icr.htm>.
92. Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1994).
93. Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995, 2 U.S.C. §1601 (1994).
94. Ethics in Government Act, §101, 5 U.S.C. App. 4 (1994).
95. Official Information Act, 1982 (N.Z.).
96. Asian Development Bank, Seminar 1996, supra note 89, at 32.
97. Dixit, supra note 38:
Where degrees of freedom are available for normative use, policymakers should
try to put in place, and facilitate the operation of, various "coping mechanisms."
They should reduce informational asymmetries and improve mechanisms that can
control opportunism. Conversely, they should try to avoid policies that create new
transaction costs or increase existing ones. Policies like import quotas and price
controls, which create artificial rent and then lead to political games to capture
and perpetuate these rents, are particularly pernicious in this regard. Of course,
many actors in the political process are trying to achieve exactly the opposite,
namely, to create rents that they can then appropriate for their private needs regardless of the social costs.
Id. at 148.
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its monopoly. 98 A shift to government auctioning of radio frequencies is
a move to capture for government use the rents associated with the fact
that radio frequencies are not infinitely divisible, making a radio oligopoly inevitable. 9 9 In some instances, lobbying takes the form of efforts to
create special market conditions that create rent capturable by the lobbying interests - for example, arguments that industry crises exist that
require special government appropriations in support of members of the
industry.
All such effort to locate and obtain rent - rent-seeking - is allocative
rather than productive. 1 0 0 In other words, such activity concerns itself
with getting a bigger slice of the pie rather than with increasing the size
of the pie. In that sense, rent-seeking, although often beneficial to the
one engaging in the practice, is unproductive for society as a whole.' 0 1
For example, official corruption increases opportunities for rent-seeking
0 2
behavior by market participants.1
Although transparency cannot eliminate rent-seeking, it can moderate it. This Article has already mentioned one way in which it does so by revealing and thereby suppressing bribery and related forms of official corruption. But it can also moderate rent-seeking which is less
98. See Anne 0. Kreuger, The PoliticalEconomy of the Rent-Seeking Society, 64 Am.
ECON. REv. 291, 295-296 (1974); Richard A. Posner, The Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation, 83 J. POL. ECON. 807, 809 (1975).
99. "Similar 'market failure' arguments hold more generally for spectrum.... In the
absence of public intervention, interfering signals would compromise operators' capability
to use scarce spectrum frequencies. Moreover, being a scarce resource, it is reasonable that
the public owner would derive an appropriate economic rent from its use." Maria Vagliasindi, & Pietro Vagliasindi, The Economics of Auctioning and Related Regulatory Issues:
The Economic Viability of the Auction Provision of the Bill and Alternatives for Direct-toHome Licenses, 5 CARDOZO J. INr'L & COMP. L. 467, 469-470 (1997).
100. See Dixit, supra note 97. But see Pablo T. Spiller, Politicians,Interest Groups, and
Regulators:A Multiple PrinciplesAgency Theory of Regulation, or 'Let Them be Bribed," 33
J.L. & ECON. 65 (1990), for an argument proposing Congressional recapture of rents that
regulated industries are willing to provide to regulators for favorable exercises of discretion
as a socially desirable alternative to prohibiting regulated industry influence on regulatory
action.
101. It is, in fact, also unproductive for any unsuccessful rent-seeker, who will have
expended rent-seeking resources without a corresponding increase in governmentally-allocated rents. Interestingly, this all-or-nothing aspect to rent-seeking (as compared to more
directly productive activity) is an incentive for any lobbying group to spend rather more on
their lobbying activities than strictly necessary, as a kind of insurance against losing the
entire lobbying investment through slight underspending.
102. Hope, supra note 82: "Finally, corruption yields effects on administrative developIt has been found that corrupt bureaucrats and leaders export their corrupt
ment ....
activities to other institutions by exerting influence and pressure on other public officials as
a means of sustaining rent-seeking opportunities." Id. at 137-38 (citing to David J. Gould
& Jose Amaro-Reyes, The Effects of Corruption on Administrative Performance: Illustrations from Developing Countries, World Bank Staff Working Paper no. 580 (Washington,
D.C.: World Bank 1983), pp. 27-35).
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crude and more legal. At its purest and most legal, rent-seeking takes
the form of lobbying through argument, political special-pleading. Here,
too, transparency has value.
Political argumentation typically takes the form of saying that "X
(which happens to be good for me) is good for society as a whole."
Although one may be suspicious of the speaker's altruism in proposing X,
such a statement is not necessarily false and may provide a valid rationale for government action. The challenge, therefore, is to distinguish
true from false instances of such claims. "With perfectly informed citizens, elected officials would not be subject to the blandishments of lobbyists, since the constituents would then know if their interests were
betrayed and defeat the unfaithful representative at the next election." 1 0 3 Similarly,
The political system is convulsive; it acts when the electorate perceives
that a crisis exists ... Hence, when it is faced with an aroused public,
time is not available to... perform a careful analysis pointing toward
an optimal policy response ... The information used to formulate a policy response in such cases is usually produced by agencies with related
10 4
responsibilities and by lobbyists who support a particular decision.
Second, broad governmental transparency will allow the merits of
the argument that X is good for society to be judged by the broadest possible swath of society. Several studies by international organizations
have addressed this issue directly and have pressed governments to
adopt strong transparency measures. In 1974 and again in 1992, the
United Nations studies declared transparency in international arms
traffic essential to controlling the illicit and dangerous spread of arms
and arms technology. 10 5 In 1983, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development identified transparency as an structural requisite for positive adjustment to trade pressures. 10 6 In 1985, the report of
a GATT study group headed by Fritz Leutwiler, former president of the
Bank for International Settlements, identified transparency as one of the
key elements in countering domestic pressures for trade protectionism.' 0 7 Four years later, a report produced under the chairmanship of
Oliver Long, GATT's Secretary-General from 1968 to 1980, repeated that
point and devoted itself to identifying the essential elements of the design of domestic administrative agencies with the mandate of providing
effective transparency to debates over trade protection and subsidies.' 0 8
103. Mancur Olsen, quoted in Long, supra note 46 at 8 and fi. 1.
104. 1971 Presidential Commission on Federal Statistics, quoted in Long, supra note 46,
at 11-12 and fi. 10.
105. United Nations, supra note 32.
106. OECD, supra note 2.
107. Leutwiler, supra note 40.
108. Long, supra note 46.
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In 1987, UNCTAD's seventh session discussed the establishment of national transparency measures to balance protectionist pressures.1 0 9 In
1997 and 1998, reports from the Asian Development Bank identified
transparency as an essential element of participatory governance.1 10
With the political benefits of official transparency come also the economic benefits:
Transparency and Predictability are important as more rapid economic development is possible when the private sector can operate
within a set of stable, predictable 'rules of the game' that facilitate investment decision-making and promote investor confidence. It is in this
area that the need for an efficient legal system is most apparent. Welldeveloped laws, which are not subject to arbitrary change, an independent judiciary, and a minimum level of technical competence within the
judiciary, are essential for ensuring predictability in business relations.
Without such predictability, transaction costs may be so high that economic activity is stifled. 1 1
Transparency - a legal infrastructure of openness about official information and part of a good pattern of information law and policy - thus has
ramifications for political participation, honest governance, and sound
economic development.
VII.

RULE OF LAW ANALYSIS

Political participation, honest governance, and sound economic development are all hallmarks of societies living under the Rule of Law.
This Article's final point is that information law and transparency are
fundamental to the Rule of Law - fundamental to ordered society and
central to ordered public life.
The Rule of Law is said to apply to any socio-legal system in which
"state power, in so far as it affects individuals, is to be exercised according to binding general rules made and known in advance, and of sufficient specificity to allow individuals to know with tolerable certainty
their rights, obligations, and liabilities.""12 A clear prerequisite of such
individual knowledge is government provision of information about regu109. Long, supra note 46, at 19-30.
110. ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, 1998, supra note 2; AsIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK,1997,
supra note 4.
111. Asian Development Bank, Law and Develoopment Seminar Proceedings:A record
of the proceedings of the Roundtable Meeting of Chief Justices and Ministers of Justice held
in Manila Philippines on 25 August 1997 (1997) [hereinafter Asian Development Bank,
Seminar 1997] (statement of Shoji Nishimoto, Chief of the Strategy and Policy Office of the
Asian Development Bank) (emphasis in the original).
112. 112. D.J. GALLIGAN, DISCRETIONARY PowERs: A LEGAL STuDY OF OFFICIAL DIscRETION (1986); Asian Development Bank, supra note 2, at 1, identifies transparency as one of
the four essential elements of good governance, in addition to accountability, predictability,
and participation.
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lation - transparency about the law. Closely allied to this requirement
for the Rule of Law is the legitimacy of the law-making process. 11 3 Parliaments lacking transparency will fail in establishing the Rule of
Law. 1 14 "[A] community is defined as having a corpus of rules which it
deems to be legitimate and by having agreed on a process that legitimates the exercise of authority, one which conduces to the making of fair
rules and fair allocations." 11 5 Finally, the Rule of Law requires an open
and accountable enforcement of law, both in regulatory administra1 17
tion1 16 and in adjudication.
8
Indeed, public accountability is impossible without transparency.1
Accountability is the principle that decision-makers, including regulators, be given a stake in the reasonableness and honesty of their actions."19 With elected executives and legislators, this may mean political
accountability, where voters know of the legislators' stands and reward
113. "Transparency is a flexible concept used in a variety of contexts, from financial
disclosure requirements to anti-corruption measures. Yet, it has taken on a particular
meaning with respect to law-making bodies, where transparent procedures are necessary
to ensure the political accountability of those enacting legislation." Rekosh, supra note 30,
at 1.
114. Rekosh also states:
Transparency is especially important, however, to ensure that elected representatives are genuinely accountable to their constituents ....
Although most citizens
may take little interest in the day-to-day mechanics of parliamentary exercises,
the existence of a free press and citizen groups ensures that information about
parliamentary activities can be properly digested by the general public.
Id. at 2.
115. Franck, supra note 56.
116. See Galligan, supra note 112, at 4-6 (discussing accountability, in political and
legal senses). "The most rudimentary requirements of political morality are that in exercising discretionary powers, officials should comply with standards of rationality, purposiveness, and morality .... " Id. at 2.
Better governance, as we are now recognizing, requires efficient and honest institutions staffed with well-trained people, enforcing the rule of law impartially and
effectively. In order to have honest agencies that serve the public interest, transparency is crucial (including collection and dissemination of much fuller information, and a free press).
Nelson, supra note 48, at 292-293.
117. Goldstein, supra note 87.
118. See generally Rekosh, supra note 30. "[Alccess to information is vital to guaranteeing accountability for all aspects of government decision-making." Id. at 6. "By accountability (or answerability) is meant having to answer for, or render account of, the way one
carries out his official tasks." PILLAI, supra note 3, at 4. "Where acts of administration
affect individual rights or interests, accountability requires that appropriate compensation
be given to the victims of illegal action or maladministration." Id. (remarks of Shad
Saleem Faruqi, a Senior Lecturer of the School of Law of the Mara Institute of Technology
in Malaysia).
119. "[A]accountability was defined as ensuring that decision makers are responsible,
either personally or institutionally, for the consequences of their decisions." IMF Study
Group, supra note 37 at 5.
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or punish them by voting accordingly. With unelected bureaucrats, accountability may mean the possibility of court review of administrative
actions or political review of unpopular initiatives. With judges, accountability may mean that litigants have the right to take the case to a
higher court or to legislators for reversal. All such government officials
may be held accountable in criminal law and through dismissal for corrupt actions. "Information is the key to accountability and in matters of
government policy, accountability is strengthened by provisions for access to information or 'open government', as it is weakened by their absence." 120 Transparency of government operations makes accountability
possible.
Examples of transparency will reveal even more clearly the links between transparency, accountability, and the Rule of Law. Under the
terms of the United States Administrative Procedure Act, any federal
agency considering the adoption of a new regulation must publish the
proposed regulation, allow public comment, and consider the public comment before issuing a final regulation. 12 1 Similarly, the voting records of
all federal legislators are published in a full and timely manner. 12 2 Likewise, all federal trial courts maintain transcripts of trial proceedings and
make them available to litigants contemplating appeals. 12 3 By contrast,
the official reports of the Malaysian national ombudsman were, until
1991, treated as official state secrets 12 4 and the lack of transparency and
accountability in some African nations is so severe that it has been held
directly responsible for the deplorable modern history of economic development in those nations. 125 Lack of transparency can be as simple as
120. PILLAI, supra note 3, at 36.
121. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §553 (1994).
122. This is a Constitutional mandate:
Each House shall keep a Journal of its Proceedings, and from time to time publish
the same, excepting such Parts as may in their Judgment require secrecy; and the
Yeas and Nays of the Members of either House on any question shall, at the Desire
of one fifth of those Present, be entered on the Journal.
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, ART. I, SEC. 5, CL. 3.
123. E.g., U.S. Ct. of Appeals for the 4th Circuit, Rule 10(c), 28 U.S.C.; U.S. Ct. of Appeals for the 6th Circuit, Rule 13, 28 U.S.C.; U.S. Ct. of Appeals for the 10th Circuit, Rule
10.1, 28 U.S.C.
124. PILLAI, supra note 3, at 4 (statement of Shad Saleem Faruqi, a Senior Lecturer of
the School of Law of the Mara Institute of Technology in Malaysia).
125. Consider:
An effective rule of law is as fundamental for a free market as it is for the effective
exercise of human rights. The rule of law assures that governments are truly accountable. Y.R. Barongo makes the point that when there is no way to enforce
accountability, the result is autocracy and widespread corruption. Similarly,
Mkandawire warns that the lack of accountability is at the center of the failure of
the African states to chart viable paths for development.
Boeninger, supra note 31, at 278 (citing Y.R. Barongo, Innovations in Systems of Governance in Africa: The Resistance Councils Experiment in Uganda (1990); Thandika
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the use of inadequate forms in official transactions:
For example, in cases of rejection [of an application for citizenship]
where they should appeal within a certain number of days to a higher
authority, they are not told what is the address of that authority and so
on. If you look at a standard form anywhere else in the world, you may
observe this, but in Malaysia the forms have become very simplified.
12 6
The simplification process has taken away anything that is helpful.
A full exposition of the nature and benefits of the Rule of Law is
beyond the scope of this Article. The central thesis of this Article is that
information law and transparency are essential elements of ordered society and thus worthy of further study and serious scholarly discussion
among legal theorists, as they have been discussed among scholars of
other disciplines. For this purpose, it suffices to acknowledge that the
Rule of Law is impossible without transparency and the accountability it
makes possible and to recognize that transparency is, at heart, an information concept. This is not to say that transparency and a sound information policy are sufficient to create an open and ordered society, 1 27 but
that such a society is impossible without strong official transparency. 128
VIII.

CONCLUSION

In the broadest sense, transparency is coming to be recognized as
essential to good governance and to establishment of the rule of law
within ordered societies. Such a view follows naturally from earlier comments about the role of transparency in establishing non-corrupt legal
Mkandawire, "Comments on Democracy and Political Instability," in African Governance
in the 1990s, working paper from the Second Annual Seminar of the African Governance
Program, The Carter Center of Emory University (Atlanta, March 23-25, 1990)).
126. PILLAI, supra note 3, at 49 (statement of K. Pathmanaban about the lack of accountability and transparency in immigration issues).
127. "In order to secure 'rule of law', legal systems and rules must meet certain minimum standards of substantial and procedural justice, such as transparency, legal consistency, 'completeness' of the rules (i.e., no no-law situations, prohibition of non liquet),
democratic legitimacy and enforceability of the rules." Petersmann, supra note 37, at 26.
128. This is not to say that there are not some voices of caution or concern about the role
of transparency in governance. Diouf, supra note 36, writing of international aid agencies
and their interest in transparency among aid-receiving nations, writes: "[tihus they define
governance in general terms: accountability, efficiency, transparency, and so on. But identifying the attributes of a subject effectively defines it. The form of governance that the
Bretton Woods institutions are encouraging looks suspiciously like a pluralistic democratic
system that de Tocqueville would not find distasteful." Id. at 322. Landell-Mills has a
similar observation: " [thus, while it can be argued that freedom of expression, institutional
pluralism, transparency, accountability, and the like (all seen as key ingredients in the
process of democracy) are important aspects of good governance, there is no convincing
evidence that multiparty democracy, which is being urged on developing countries by some
donors, is necessary for social and economic development." Id. at 305.
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and bureaucratic regimes, and from transparency's role in establishing
political accountability:
Transparency is a flexible concept used in a variety of contexts, from
financial disclosure requirements to anti-corruption measures. Yet, it
has taken on a particular meaning with respect to law-making bodies,
where transparent procedures are necessary
to ensure the political ac29
countability of those enacting legislation.1
Better governance, as we are now recognizing, requires efficient and
honest institutions staffed with well-trained people, enforcing the rule of
law impartially and effectively. In order to have honest agencies that
serve the public interest, transparency is crucial (including collection
130
and dissemination of much fuller information, and a free press).
In other words, effective policies of governmental transparency not
only promote, but are essential to good governance, including citizen participation, official accountability, clean government, and the rule of law.
Such policies promote the most effective and inclusive debate on issues of
public significance, and ensure that chosen policies are carried out in a
manner that reflects the public consensus.
The purpose of this Article has been to establish the importance of
information law and to encourage its further study. By using insights
from information theory, economics, political economy, and other disciplines,' 3 ' this Article has sought to demonstrate the centrality of information law to open societies.
Information is a difficult concept to grasp, and a commodity unlike
traditional goods. The unusual economics of the information marketplace and its role in regulating governance structures through preventing corruption, providing political accountability, and generating
economic development demonstrate that the evolving discipline of information law will have an increasing importance in legal scholarship in
years to come. This Article has attempted to begin the process of incorporating non-legal disciplines into this study, to establish information
law's rightful place in legal scholarship, and to point out some directions
for future scholarly efforts, particularly in the area of transparency.

129. Rekosh, supra note 30, at 1.
130. Nelson, supra note 48, at 292-293.
131. See Mock, supra note 78, for the application of game theory to information law.

